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ON NATIONAL VS. LOCAL POLLUTION CONTROL 
The burden of the discussion of this workshop on pollution Control 
seems to be a critique-of the 1971 Report of the President's Council of 
1/ Economic Advisors on public policy directed to environmental quality.-
The arguments thus far, particularly those addressed to jurisdictional 
control, indicate that the statement of policy by the CEA would lead to 
a policy of local autonomy whereby different pollution charges will 
exist. The lack of uniform pollution pricing leads to unequal marginal 
rates of substitution and transfor:nation between environment and other 
g·oods. A cone lusion which comes ringing through and is apparent in this 
discussion is that the pricing decisi.on should devolve upon the Federal 
government. 
It is implied that uniform pollution price setting (in the context 
of the discussion, the decision on pollution toleration) means a single 
and national agency has to make the prjci.ng decisfon. This argument is 
not unlike that of Stein's critique of-the CEA report on environmental 
policy}:./ 
Allow me to give a word of caution and a contention about uniform 
pollution charges and optimality, but without implying a vested interest 
in the CEA analysis or decentralization. First, to jump from advocation 
of uniform pricing to a Federal price setter has logical problems. The 
simplest competitive model of economic theory indicates no incompatibility 
!/ See U. S. Council of Economic Adviso~s, Economic Report of the Presi-
dent, Washington, D. C., U. s. Govern~ent Printing Office, February, 
1971, p. 121. 
Y Jerome L. Stein, "The 1971 Report of the President's Council of 
Economic Advisors: Micro-Economic Aspects of Public Policy," Atperi-
can Economic Review, Vol. 61, 770.4, September, 1971, pp. 531-537. 
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between a uniform price and decentralization of ownership of goods 
traded. Indeed, the rationale for deceri~~alization is that such a 
system of ownership enables the optimum price to he established at 
lowest cost. This is, in fact, the environmental problem we face and 
the reason for finding a policy with which to resolve the problem. 
Simply, the present property rules or rights have resulted in too low 
a price for the use of the environment. 
The disequilibrium can be eliminated once the equilibrium price is 
discovered. The discovery of the equilibrium price is not likely to 
come cheaply given the present ill-deEned property rights for use of 
the environment. This seems to be the reason for the CEA recommendation 
for local control versus a single federal price mechanism for control.1/ 
The Council makes the point that the agency making the rules must be 
responsive to gainers and losers in property right specification and, 
such agency must be responsive to pressures stemming from localities 
bearing most of the benefits and costs of pollution. The CEA may be 
naive in supposing benefit and cost :::1easnres to be more accurate if 
pollution control becomes the responsibihty of local agencies. How-
ever, the arguments expressed thus far, and by Stein for that matter, 
give us no reason that federal control, or ;ne;:isure of be.1efits and costs, 
will be superior to that of any other control hierarchy. 
Now my second point deals with optimality and uniform pollution 
charges which are set nationally. Assume for simplicity of explanation 
two localities where, due to i11-defined .property rights, a zero pollu-
tion price exists initially and other factor prices and production con-
ditions are identical. Thus, marginal benefits from emitting effluents 
1/ See Economic Report of the President, 1971, p. 121. 
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into the environment are the same for each locality. Assume the marginal 
pollution damage functions differ between.localities and, further assume 
that the damage function in the second locality, D2, lies below and to 
the right of the d:tmage fonc tion for the first locality, n1• These 
functions along with the common benefit function, B , are illustrated 
c 
in Figure 1 below. 
Net-benefit-maximizing local governments set different prices under 
these assumptions. The government in locality one would set Pi as the 
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pollution price while P2 would be set in locality two. Under the above 
assumptions, and so long as it is sufficiently costly for relocation of 
resources committed to effluent-generating production, a net-benefit 
maximizing central government agency would set the same prices for the 
localities. That is, local price differences will be required for effi-
ciency unless zero short run costs of resource movement exist. 
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The fact that the ~~rginal rate of substitution between the environ-
ment and other goods between localities <1Sffers is of no relevance until 
the cost of relocating pollution activity is low enough to allow gains 
from interlocality trade in such activity. Net gains from trade will 
be exploited once the equilibrium (short run) prices, P1 and Pz, have 
been established long enough for relocation costs to become sufficiently 
small. A response to the difference in price between localities will 
result in pollution activity re location from locality one to locality 
two since P1 ) Pz. The marginal benefit functions in the two localities 
will no longer be identical. The marginal benefit function in locality 
one will shift leftward while the function of locality two will shift 
rightward. These shifts are illustrated by B1 and Bz in Figure 2. 
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other factor prices vary between the localities and offset the price dif-
ferentials for pollution, this convC'rgcnce may not occur even in the 
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long run. Land prices, for example, arc likely to vary between any 
two localities. Some goods and services· wi 11 only be produced in the 
urhanized locations nnd the division of labor and extent of the market 
may tie in certain production activity despite higher land prices in these 
areas. The equiJ ibriU'.n price different ia 1 s in other factor prices wil 1 
not provide a force for equalization of pollution prices between locali-
ties. 
There also is likely to be some 1ong-run costs to relocating pro-
duction from location two in our case to location one. This could be 
due to the foregone produ ~ tivity of an urb;in or !ik1.j or market area loca-
tion. In the long run, optimal pollutio~ prices will converge up to 
the point where they differ by these relocation costs. Further conver-
gence in the long run would mean the environmental gain of relocation 
would not exceed the relocation cost<>. 
In the case where no long-r.un relocation costs exist, equilibrium 
in the long run would ':>e accomplished with a uniform pollution charge, 
Pc, and the new short-run margin<tl benefit functions in localities one 
and two would be Bi and Bz respectively. ·so long as each locality is 
concerned solely with maximizing its own. benefits, pollution will shift 
from location one to location two. The pollution price in location one 
will fall and the pollution price in location two will rise until a 
long-run Pareto-efficient equil ibrim.1 is attained. Neither locality 
need be concerned with the pollution price in the other locality, and 
each only react to the resource shifts in each locality. A national-
net-benefit-maximizing federal agency would wish to encourage pollution 
to shift from location one to two and would not want to impose a differ-
ent temporal pattern even with knowledge of the long-run equilibrium 
pollution price. The Pareto-efficient pricing of the use of the environ-
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ment is consistent with either local or federal control. 
The CEA report assumes local control is likely to give a more 
accurate account of benefits and damages. This assumption relies on a 
notion of presumed information-cost advantages in the exercise of self 
interest in local control. Now, following Stein's argument against 
local control, it is true that firms r;iay exercise monopsony power and 
prevent localities fron even optimizing. Also, the environment may be 
a public good depending on the particular aspect of envirnoment as a 
good that is at issue. Certain scenic or irreplacable environments 
would come under this definition ~uch as Hells Canyon (excuse my begging 
a controversial issue). 'nle exercise of monopsony power and the fact 
that the environment is often a pnblic good may cause inaccurate informa-
tion about benefits and damages generated under local pollution control. 
However, governments are always monopoly sellers of pollution 
rights within the jurisdiction they :;overn~ As the sale of pollution 
rights becomes more centralized, fewer location alternatives become 
available to firms (given costs of alternative location exist). As 
this occurs prices for pollution rights will become inefficiently higher. 
The public good argument points out the fact that the enjoyment 
of an environment by any one person does not' preclude enjoyment of that 
environment by any other person (unless crowding externalities occur). 
No one locality in its autonomy then is consistent with a Pareto opti-
mum if it makes a decision to price the use of the environment to gain 
higher local income. The social margina~ rate of substitution between 
such an envirnoment and other goods is equal to the sum of the goods 
which the nation gives up (er is willing to give up) to protect the 
environment. This sum is greater than the same marginal rate of substi-
tution of the loca H ty si nee many people may enjoy the environment 
without paying its value to the local people (merchants, local public 
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fee systems, etc.). The appropriate rate of substitution then becomes 
the maximum sum in taxes that the voters.of the nation are willing to 
impose on thems~lves to protect the environment. It seems, in the 
public good case, that such a policy conclusion cannot be entertained 
without knowledge of the importance of the externality in the use of 
the envirnoment. Further, a democratic process must have voting power 
distributed in the same manner as the consequence at issue to avoid 
bias; i.e., discrepancy between marginal costs and marginal benefits 
shared in the process of public good provision must converge to zero. 
If the extern2lity from environmental use in a locality is sufficiently 
large as to cause the electorate to bear equal or at least a large 
fraction of the consequences the national electorate would probably 
set appropriate pollution prices for a locality. If the reverse were 
true, then inappropriate prices would be·set for the locality. There 
may be a case for a tax on localities allo~ing pollution, but there 
seems to be no general argument for national price setting or con-
trol. 
To summarize my discussion, nation::if po1.lution pric<- setting is 
not a requirement for a Pareto optimum, and may not be so even in the 
long run. Decentralized control is not inconsistent with the attain-
ment of efficient pollution prices so long as each locality maximizes 
its own net benefits. The resulting temporal price pattern, in our 
example above, of high and falling prices in location one and low and 
rising pri.ces in location two, emerges. t.Q be a dynamically efficient 
pattern. The real issue of national vs. local control then is whether 
national or local control will yield more accurate information about 
pollution damages and benefits. Local control creates 100nopsony power 
for firms. National control converts the monopsony power problem 
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to a national monopoly probleu. National control to express concern 
about a local environment on the part of~~he national public may pro-
duce inappropriate pollution prices depending on the extent of the 
externality in the use of the local environ:nent. 
